Is the virtue of the good citizen the same as the virtue of the good man? Aristotle addresses this in Politics 3.4. His answer is twofold. On the one hand, (the account for Difference) they are not the same both because what the citizen’s virtue is depends on the constitution, on what preserves it, and on the role the citizen plays in it, and because the good citizens in the best constitution cannot all be good men, whereas the good man’s (...) virtue is uniform. On the other hand, (the account for Identity) the two virtues are identical in the good men in the best constitution, in which all are good citizens, each possessing the ability for ruling and for being ruled. This nuanced answer can be seen as Aristotle’s synthesis of a Periclean view (contribution to state blots out personal wrongs) and a Socratic view (no good citizen is without justice). Its nuances reflect the extent to which Aristotle’s conceptions of good citizenship and the best constitution accommodate deviations of what is probable from the human ideal set out in his ethical writings. In the present chapter, I will first address three puzzles regarding the nuances of Aristotle’s answer. Second, I will consider one question about its implication: Does Aristotle’s account for Difference turn out to entail something ultra-Periclean: that no one can simultaneously be a good man and a good citizen in any constitution other than the best? I shall argue the negative. (shrink)

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

In Mengzi 6A4, Gaozi states that “yì 義 (propriety, rightness) is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi says of yì that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi’s resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly (...) is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi holds three although he does not convey them in his statement. As for Meng Jiz’s defense of his statement, Meng Jizi cites a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi’s response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of yì may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi’s statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the Mengzi rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that yì is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi’s position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies yì. (shrink)

The study examines the relationship between the strength of an organizationÕs ethical climate and ethical problems involving human resource management. Data were collected through a survey of 1078 human resource managers. The results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the strength of an organization'ss ethical climate and the seriousness of ethical violations and a statistically significant positive relationship between an organization'ss ethical climate and success in responding to ethical issues. Thus, interventions that strengthen an organization'ss ethical climate may help (...) manage ethical behavior within organizations. (shrink)

A comparative study of Zumel's and other scholastic theories concerning the influence of the understanding or reason upon the will.--L. K. B.

On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the well-intended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by (...) pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psycho-physiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. (shrink)

A clear and well-written defense of the Christian theistic world-view, marked by a constructive and well-balanced philosophical orientation, with only slight hints, through most of the book, of the underlying religious fundamentalism. The stress on the fundamental importance of commitment is balanced by a recognition of its constitutive role in reasoning, and by an insistence on the need for the integration of the intellectual, the practical, and the religious. The author takes as his main field of evidence man's "power of (...) moral and rational self-transcendence," and builds upon an epistemological scheme involving a triad of methods of knowing--by acquaintance, by inference, and by moral self-acceptance. The book concludes with a frankly dogmatic summary of the author's evangelical convictions. --L. K. B. (shrink)

A thoughtful inventor-businessman's statement of the simple truth about the world: All is energy, with causal order everywhere, and with such forces dominating as to justify optimistic trust in the necessary course of events.--L. K. B.

Five previously published articles dealing with various topics in philosophy of history. They center on the problem of a metaphysics adequate to a radical emphasis on history over against nature and to a conception of values as emergent through history.--L. K. B.

Although it deals with the important problem of the metaphysical implications of linguistic structure and the basis for selection of a cognitive language, and contains some interesting theses, this book is made almost useless by its imprecise and unclear argumentation and awkward style.--L. K. B.

By confining themselves to elementary principles, the authors manage to cover with an appropriate balance of simplicity and rigor a wider range of materials than is common in so readable an introduction. There is an emphasis on logic as a syntax for language. Though not a text book, the work meets very well the authors' aim of "presenting to Spanish speaking readers, in a succinct, clear, and rigorous manner, the fundamental themes of the discipline."--L. K. B.

A meticulous examination of the logical and axiological principles of analogical inference in legal reasoning. The first part presents an elementary but useful survey of traditional and modern logical analyses of analogy and analogical inference. In the second part, these concepts are examined in their juridical applications. Much is made of the conclusion that analogical inference cannot be rendered "binding" by logical considerations alone; to make up for this in legal reasoning, axiological principles must be employed.--L. K. B.

This badly written book has many marks of quackery--it is jargonic, repetitious, sometimes weird. But there are a few traces of a kernel of significant critique of philosophical method from a viewpoint combining elements of extreme operationalism and psychoanalysis. Philosophy is viewed as an activity which could have considerable therapeutic value--i.e., lead to growth in "awareness," released creativity, and increased emotional and intellectual maturity--if it is conducted under the guidance of the author's precepts.--L. K. B.

The chief of these five essays is the effort of a composer and conductor, deeply attached to Kant and widely read in mathematics and popularized physics, to disclose in "music's innate design" a key to the nature of "subliminal" reality, the "Ever Present." Result: both the order of music and the order of subliminal reality are elliptical. The accompanying essays, of chiefly biographical interest, present a philosophical critique of the new mathematics and geometry by a doctrinaire young Kantian. -- L. (...) K. B. (shrink)

An etymological proof of the title; presented in a "spirit of fun" and to be taken in the same spirit.--L. K. B.

A fanciful re-shuffling of Kantian words and hints from such works as Baldwin's Dictionary into a metaphysic involving an existential "I-in-itself" which posits subsistent things-in-themselves to constitute its world. --L. K. B.

This volume brings together flux essays by an eminent scholar on the origins, development, and import of Kant's philosophy, chiefly in its metaphysical aspects. Four of these were separately published between 1924 and 1926, but until now have been difficult to obtain, despite great demand. Their appearance here will be welcomed. The thesis emerging from these studies is that the critical philosophy originates in metaphysical probings concerning the nature and presuppositions of being, and issues in doctrines which, despite psychological, epistemological, (...) and ethical presentation, are intended to have definite ontological import. --L. K. B. (shrink)

A cross-cultural approach to moral psychology starts from researchers withholding judgments about universal right and wrong and instead exploring what the members of a community subjectively perceive to be moral or immoral in their local context. This study seeks to identify the moral concerns that are most relevant to listeners of hip-hop music. We use validated psychological surveys including the Moral Foundations Questionnaire to assess which moral concerns are most central to hip-hop listeners. Results show that hip-hop listeners prioritize concerns (...) of justice and authenticity more than non-listeners and deprioritize concerns of respecting authority. These results suggest that the concept of the “good person” within hip-hop culture is fundamentally a person that is oriented towards social justice, rebellion against the status quo, and a deep devotion to keeping it real. Results are followed by a discussion of the role of youth subcultures in moral socialization. (shrink)

Kurrâ’ya nispet edilen aynı kelimelerdeki edâ farklılıklarının tartışmalara sebep olmasından ötürü kıraat ihtilafı olan kelimelerde ihticâc yapılmasına gereksinim duyulmuştur. Delil getirmek manasında kullanılan ihticâc kavramı, kıraat ihtilafları için söz konusu olduğunda ise kıraat ihtilaflarının sıhhat zemininin ortaya konması kastedilmektedir. Ayrıca 2. asrın sonlarında kıraat tevcîhlerinin yapıldığı müstakil eserler ortaya çıkmakla birlikte kıraat alan yazınına ait genel telifatlarda da kıraat ihticâclarının yapıldığı görülmektedir. Kıraat müelliflerinden biri olan İbnu’l-Cezerî de Neşru’l-ḳırââti’l-‘aşr adlı eserinde zaman zaman kıraat ihticâcına yer vermektedir. Mezkûr eserdeki kıraat ihticâcları (...) hakkında tespit edilebildiği kadarıyla yapılmış tek bir çalışma bulunmaktadır. Fakat bu çalışmada, kıraatten ve bunun dışındaki disiplinlerden yeterince istifade edilmediği belirlenmiştir. Ayrıca selef ulemasının Neşru’l-ḳırââti’l-‘aşr adlı esere ihticâc konusunda etkisi özelinde bir çalışmaya da rastlanmamıştır. Buradan hareketle elinizdeki bu çalışmada, İbnu’l-Ce-zerî’nin kıraat ihticâcına dair uygulamaları Neşru’l-ḳırââti’l-‘aşr adlı eser özelinde incelenmiş, me‘âni’l-Kur’ân ve me‘âni’l-kıraat literatürlerinin ortaya çıktıkları dönem dikkate alınarak h. 2.-4. asırlarda kaleme alınan bu literatürlere ait eserlerin İbnu’l-Cezerî’ye ait kıraat tevcîhlerine etkisinin olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Çalışmanın neticesinde İbnu’l-Cezerî’nin yaptığı kıraat tevcîhlerinden ele alınanların bir kısmına, söz konusu üç asırda kaleme alınan me‘âni’l-Kur’ân ve me‘âni’l-kıraat telifatında ekseriyetle yer verilmediği saptanmıştır. İbnu’l-Cezerî’nin ise kıraat ihtilafının olmadığı yerlerde dahi ilgili edâ için ihticâc yaptığı müşahede edilmiştir. Buna ilaveten İbnu’l-Cezerî’nin Neşr’de yaptığı ihticâc uygulamalarının me‘âni’l-Kur’ân ve me‘âni’l-kıraat telifatında yapılan ihticâc işlemleriyle benzeştiği görülmüştür. Yine Neşr’in tevcîh eseri olmaması hasebiyle de İbnu’l-Cezerî tarafından yapılan ihticâcların ihtiyaç merkezli olarak kendini gösterdiği belirlenmiştir. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Mr. Raghavendrachar has undertaken the difficult task of representing the system to which he is bound by religion in the impartial way of an objective philosophical study. Philosophy to him means: to reveal the nature of the ultimate reality, but, on the other hand, he claims that philosophy has the practical and ethical ends of the world's uplift. Here already two different aims, a merely epistemological and a pedagogical one, are taken together. Further considerations come in from the religious angle. (...) As an orthodox Vedic scholar Mr. Raghavendrachar defines philosophy proper as philosophy together with the interpretations of the Veda. Besides, as a devout follower of the Madhva School of Visnuism, he propagates as a means of philosophy the study of Visnuite teaching. It is from these divergent presuppositions that Mr. Raghavendrachar's essay is written. While taking his starting point from epistemology, the author puts into the foreground the investigations of the ultimate reality and know- ability. Thus he emphasizes less those problems which are generally considered as the central ones of Indian philosophy, i.e. the problems of philosophy of religion, than those of philosophy general, of Consciousness and Ego, of Error and canons of Truth, etc. This results in an unusual explanation, or rather repudiation, of the term "Dvaita Philosophy." Mr. Raghavendrachar claims that the theological problem of the identity or difference between the Jlva, the individual Soul, and the Brahman, the universal Spirit, has not essential bearing. He asserts that the so-called Dvaitam is in reality a Brahma-Advaitam, not unlike the classical Advaitam, monism and identification between the highest and the individual Atman, and not unlike also the Visistddvaitam, the modified monism or dualism. Mr. Raghaven- drachar points out that Madhva, the founder of the so-called Dvaita-school, never himself used the term Dvaitam, but only draws the distinction between svatantram and a-svatantram, between independent and dependent entities. Brahman, which is here identified with Visnu, is interpreted as the only inde- pendent ground of the world from which originate all dependent, i.e. empirical, phenomena in which the Jwvas, the individual Souls, are included. Thus the religious question is turned into an epistemological one, and he strives to put Safikara, the pure Monist, logically in the wrong, as confusing through his identification of Brahman and Jiva the "condition" with the "conditioned." On the other hand, Mr. Raghavendrachar approaches the problem as a pro- fessed Realist. "Actual difference is the core of reality". Thus the very same empirical world which he beforehand claims as but "conditioned," becomes now for him the centre of his investigation. The confusion between "condition" and "conditioned," for which he blames Safikara, the Idealist, arises for himself from his realistic standpoint. Safikara, in the opinion of the reviewer, avoids the difficulty of such a confusion by proclaiming that all "conditioned," all empirical singleness, is only of lesser truth, is only a laukika expression for the understanding of the masses, while in reality all differentiation is non-existent. Madhva and his present interpreter, on the other hand, emphasize that even in the unifying stage of liberation differences between the Divine and the Jiva and among the single Jivas themselves are still upheld. Mr. Raghavendrachar's second definition of philosophy quoted above is that of philosophy as a practical means of betterment of the world. This peda- gogical purpose of philosophy gives the author the opportunity of advocating his own sectarian standpoint. The Vedanta is for him the best of all possible systems and reveals undoubtable and unquestionable truth. Thus it comple- ments, or it even corrects, the truth gained from empirical facts. Among the Vedantic Schools he considers his own, the Madhva School, the most accom- plished one. Consequently, he has to devalue ankiara's views from this angle also. Safikara, he claims, has only made use of mahdvdikyas, great sayings of the Upanisads; he has to concede to his opponent that he finds support for his interpretations in the most significant Upanisadic teachings. Not many other equally valid mahdvakyas, nor lesser Upanisadic sayings are, however, intro- duced by the author in favour of his own against Saikara's standpoint, Partly this omission is due to Mr. Raghavendrachar's basic dogma that the Veda as a whole is revealed truth and cannot be contradictory to itself; partly-at any rate as the reviewer sees it-it is due to the fact that Safikara's explanations are the most representative of the main Upanisadic doctrines. The difficulty of Mr. Raghavendrachar's self-imposed task of subjective and at the same time objective representation is clearly evident throughout his work. Equally evident, however, throughout Mr. Raghavendrachar's exposi- tions are his two remarkable gifts: genuine religious devotion and excellent training in logical discussion. Review by: Betty Heimann. (shrink)